Credicorp Ltd. (NYSE: BAP) — An Elite Andean Franchise with a Fintech Option, Priced as if Peru Were Chile

Report date: 2026-07-11. All figures reconcile to the FY2025 Form 20-F (filed 2026-04-27), the Q1 2026 earnings release and call (2026-05-15), and the sources in the appendix. Financials are reported in Peruvian soles (S/); the ADR trades in USD (USD/PEN ≈ 3.7).

⚡ Claude’s Take

This is the author’s own independent opinion and general information only — not investment advice. The body of this report below takes no position, names no price target, and discusses valuation only as embedded expectations and scenarios.

Verdict: HOLD — a genuinely elite emerging-market bank at a full-to-rich price, bought after the good news arrived. Not a short at any price (quality + momentum + a real Yape option protect the downside), but not a fresh entry here either. Accumulate only on a Peru shock. Conviction: medium. Directional zone (on ~$139 book/share): I treat ~2.2–2.5× book (~$305–$350) as fair value for a durable high-teens-ROE franchise with an unproven fintech kicker; I would find it genuinely attractive below ~2.0× book (~$280) — roughly where it traded as recently as mid-2025 — and I would trim/fade above ~2.8× book (~$390). At $400.81 (2.87× book, ~15.3× earnings, an all-time high) you are paying the richest multiple in the stock’s listed history, and a richer multiple than Itaú commands on a higher 23% ROE.

Credicorp is, on the numbers, one of the best-run banks in the emerging world: a dominant ~33% share of Peruvian system loans and ~36% of deposits, a 63.9%-low-cost-deposit funding franchise that produces the cheapest cost of funds in the country, a 19–21% group ROE (BCP standalone ~25–30%), a best-in-class ~40% BCP efficiency ratio, and — the genuine growth kicker — Yape, a payments-to-lending super-wallet that already reaches ~82% of economically-active Peruvians and just crossed into ROE-accretive territory. The problem is not the bank; it is the price and the timing. The stock has compounded ~+88% over the last twelve months to a fresh high, and the factor model is blunt that this is a crowded, high-Sharpe, low-drawdown quality-momentum trade whose single dominant loading is “Peru” itself (Country:Peru beta 0.95) — a leveraged bet on Peruvian macro, copper and politics far more than on anything management decides. Two things drove the run, and both are now largely in the price: (1) Yape’s monetization inflection, and (2) the June-2026 election of the market-friendly, pro-mining Keiko Fujimori over the interventionist candidate management had openly feared — the exact resolution the bull case needed. The reason I stop at HOLD is that the current 2.87× book demands the market underwrite peak ROE held indefinitely and a compressed, Chile-like cost of equity, at the same time — while the record ROE is itself cyclically flattered by a trough cost of risk (1.3% vs. ~2.5% in 2023), a peak NIM, and one-off pension-withdrawal liquidity; normalized through-cycle ROE is more like ~17–18%. From the richest-ever multiple, the return math is asymmetric to the downside: the base case earns a coupon-like return, the bull case is mostly book growth plus a ~3.5% dividend (there is no re-rating fuel left), and the bear case — one Peru political or copper shock away — is a double-digit de-rating.

The framing is quality-compounder-at-a-record-price / a momentum-extended EM-macro proxy. Bull trigger: Yape delivers a genuine, durable fee-earnings step-up (management has hinted at a post-election “sustainable ROE north of 20%”) and Peru stays on a ratings-upgrade path — that turns “fully priced” into “cheap for the quality.” Bear trigger: cost of risk normalizes toward ~2% and ROE prints below ~17% for two-plus quarters, or a Fujimori government descends into the same impeachment/gridlock that felled her five predecessors — either exposes 2.87× book as a cycle-top. Tag: “The best bank in the Andes — repriced for a politics that just went right.”

📈 Stock Price Action — Five-Year Event Map

Factual price history from the five-year daily price series; the price move is Fact, the attributed cause is Interpretation. No recommendation, no price target.

Over the trailing five years BAP ran a near-5× one-way ascent — from a Pedro-Castillo-shock low of ~$81 (Aug-2021) to an all-time high of $400.81 (10-Jul-2026), where it trades today (0% off its high). It sits ~31% above its 200-day moving average (~$306) and has nearly doubled inside its 52-week range of ~$212–$401. There is no round-trip down: the stock is at its cyclical and all-time peak.

Cycle narrative. (1) The stock collapsed ~41% in H1-2021 as Peru elected far-left Pedro Castillo, sparking nationalization fears and capital flight — the ~$81 August-2021 print is the five-year low. (2) Through late-2021 to end-2023 BAP was dead-money-in-a-range, whipsawed by Castillo’s self-coup attempt, impeachment and arrest (Dec-2022), the Boluarte succession, deadly protests, and an El-Niño-driven 2023 recession. (3) 2024 delivered the first durable leg up (+31%) as macro and bank earnings recovered and the central bank eased. (4) H1-2025 (+28%) layered the Yape-monetization growth narrative on top, aided by strong copper. (5) H2-2025 (+15%) reflected record earnings at ~18–19% ROE and returning EM inflows. (6) The explosive move came Jan–Feb-2026 (+29% in weeks) on a Q4/FY2025 earnings blow-out plus rating optimism — this is where the P/B vaulted to its richest-ever. (7) March–May was a ~9% profit-taking consolidation, briefly rattled by election uncertainty. (8) June–July re-accelerated ~31% to the $400.81 all-time high, catalyzed by the market-friendly election outcome and a Morgan Stanley upgrade. Every price move is Fact; every attributed driver is Interpretation.

1. Executive Summary

Credicorp Ltd. is the apex financial holding company of Peru and one of the most dominant, most profitable banking franchises in the emerging world. Through Banco de Crédito del Perú (BCP) — which alone contributes 85% of group net income — plus microfinance leader Mibanco, insurer Grupo Pacífico, pension manager Prima AFP, wealth/investment-bank Credicorp Capital, and the Yape digital-wallet ecosystem, Credicorp sits at the center of the Peruvian economy. It commands ~33.5% of system loans and ~36.5% of deposits (Dec-2025, SBS), roughly 1.7× its nearest competitor, inside a rational four-bank oligopoly that controls ~82% of the market.

The FY2025 result was a record: net income attributable of S/6,925M (+25.9% YoY, ≈US$1.87bn), a 19.05% ROAE (up from 16.5% in 2024 and 15.8% in 2023), a 6.27% NIM, a 46.6% efficiency ratio, and a cost of risk that fell to 1.63%. Q1 2026 accelerated further to a 21.1% ROE with cost of risk at just 1.3%. The engine of the franchise is its 63.9%-low-cost-deposit funding base (funding cost 2.31%) — the cheapest in Peru and the mechanism by which BCP earns a standalone ROAE of ~25–30%, far above its ~13–15% cost of equity. Layered on top is Yape, a two-sided payment network with 16.4 million monthly active users (~82% of economically-active Peruvians), +80% payment-volume growth, lending revenue up 3.6×, now contributing 17% of group fee income and — for the first time — accretive to group ROE.

The debate is not about business quality; it is about price, timing, and the durability of a record. BAP trades at 2.87× book value (99.98th percentile of its own ten-year range — the richest ever) and 15.3× trailing earnings (89.8th percentile) after a ~+88% twelve-month run to an all-time high of $400.81. On the Gordon math, that multiple requires the market to underwrite both a sustained ~19–20% ROE held indefinitely and a compressed, Chile-like Peru cost of equity — two peaks at once. Yet the record ROE is materially cyclically flattered: cost of risk sits at a trough (1.3% vs. ~2.5% during the 2023 El Niño stress), NIM is near a cyclical high, and roughly half of recent deposit growth is transient pension-withdrawal liquidity. A normalized through-cycle ROE is closer to ~17–18% (management guides ~19.5% for FY2026). Two catalysts drove the re-rate and are now largely priced in: Yape’s monetization inflection and the June-2026 election of market-friendly Keiko Fujimori over the interventionist candidate. From here, the return skeleton is asymmetric to the downside — the base case is coupon-like, the bull case is mostly book growth plus a ~3.5% dividend, and the bear case is a multiple-driven drawdown on any Peru political or copper shock. This is a superb business that has already captured its re-rating; the forward opportunity depends on ROE durability, not further multiple expansion.

2. Business Overview

Credicorp Ltd. is a Bermuda-incorporated financial holding company (NYSE: BAP; also listed on the Lima Stock Exchange) that files as a Foreign Private Issuer (Form 20-F/6-K, CIK 0001001290). It is, in substance, a Peruvian universal-banking conglomerate with insurance, pensions, microfinance, wealth-management and fintech arms, plus modest footprints in Bolivia, Chile and Colombia. Founded around BCP (established 1889), it has been controlled for generations by interests associated with the Romero family (~12.3% economic stake plus board influence).

Segment structure and profit contribution (FY2025, % of attributable net income). The group is overwhelmingly a bank:

Contributions exceed 100% because the “Other/eliminations” line (−11.1%) captures holding-company overhead and the still-investment-heavy disruptive/fintech portfolio (Yape, Tenpo, Culqi). Universal Banking (BCP + BCP Bolivia) ≈ 86.5% of group earnings. On the three-year trend, BCP’s share has eased (88.0% → 88.9% → 85.3%) as Mibanco (4.1% → 6.4%) and Pacífico recovered — a modest diversification, but this remains a BCP story with satellites.

How it makes money. The dominant revenue stream is net interest income — S/14,716M in FY2025 (+4.3%), the spread on a S/149,985M loan book funded by an enormous, sticky, low-cost deposit base. Around this sit fee/transaction income (increasingly Yape-driven), insurance underwriting (Pacífico’s underwriting result rose 26% to S/882M), pension fees (Prima AFP), and wealth/investment-banking fees (Credicorp Capital, AUM +28–34% YoY). By currency, the soles NIM (8.88%) dwarfs the foreign-currency NIM (3.54%), so the multi-decade de-dollarization of the Peruvian system (USD now just 21.9% of loans, 31.4% of deposits) is quietly NIM-accretive.

Recurring vs. cyclical. NII, fee income, insurance premiums and pension fees are recurring and annuity-like; treasury/trading gains and — critically — the cost of risk are cyclical. Because Peru’s mining-and-hydrocarbons complex is ~14.4% of GDP, loan demand and asset quality carry a real commodity/macro beta. The FY2025 earnings jump was substantially a cost-of-risk normalization (1.63% vs. 2.42% in 2024) rather than a purely structural step-up — a distinction that matters greatly for the valuation.

Yape — the ecosystem within the bank. Yape began as a free peer-to-peer payments app and has become a payments-to-lending super-wallet: 16.4M MAU (end-2025: 15.9M MAU, 19.1M registered), ~67 transactions per active user per month, a Net Promoter Score of 77, and — the inflection — lending revenue up 3.6× YoY with only ~30% credit penetration of its base. Effective April 1, 2026, Credicorp consolidated Yape (Peru + Bolivia), the Eo digital account, and Chile’s Tenpo into a single neobank unit under Raimundo Morales, intended to export the technology platform regionally. Yape is now 17% of group fee income and 8% of group risk-adjusted revenue, up from ~1% and ~2.5% respectively.

Verdict. Credicorp is a diversified-on-paper but bank-dominated financial conglomerate whose economics are driven by the deposit-and-spread machine at BCP, cushioned by recurring insurance/pension/fee streams and turbocharged by an increasingly monetized fintech platform. It is well-understood at the unit level (deposits × spread × credit cost, plus fees and underwriting), and the fintech layer is a genuine — if not-yet-fully-proven — source of incremental growth rather than a distraction.

3. Industry Dynamics

Structure — a concentrated, rational oligopoly. Peruvian banking is a textbook four-firm oligopoly. As a share of the banking sector at Dec-2025 (SBS), the leaders are BCP (33.5% loans / 36.5% deposits / 35.8% assets), BBVA Perú (22.1% / 20.8% / 19.7%), Interbank (13.6% / 13.4% / 13.4%), and Scotiabank Perú (13.1% / 11.8% / 12.6%). The big four hold ~82% of loans and deposits; adding Credicorp’s Mibanco lifts the group to ~37% of system loans. BCP is #1 across assets, deposits and loans, and roughly 1.7× the size of the #2 on loans — the classic dominant-scale configuration that supports rational pricing and above-cost-of-capital returns for the leaders. Product-level, BCP leads mortgages (32.6%), credit cards (33.3%, +112bp in 2025), corporate loans (38.1%) and wholesale/commercial (37.2%).

Profit pool and penetration. The Peruvian banking pool is fat — BCP standalone earns a ~25–30% ROAE — precisely because the market is concentrated and under-served. Domestic credit to the private sector is only ~40–43% of GDP (vs. ~60% in Colombia, ~70% in Chile, and well over 100% in developed markets), and a large share of the adult population remains informally banked or unbanked. This is the structural growth runway that underwrites both the traditional franchise and the Yape financial-inclusion thesis: penetration can rise for a decade without the industry becoming crowded, because scale, distribution and data are the binding constraints, not capital.

Macro and sovereign backdrop. Peru is investment-grade — Moody’s Baa1 (two notches above the IG floor, outlook improved in 2024) and S&P/Fitch BBB-/BBB — with GDP growth of ~3%, a credible inflation-targeting central bank (BCRP; policy rate ~4.25%), one of the lowest public-debt ratios in Latin America, and structurally one of the most stable currencies in the EM complex (the sol dipped only to ~S/3.43 during election jitters before settling ~S/3.25–3.35). This macro orthodoxy is the reason the market is willing — perhaps too willing — to assign Peru a lower cost of equity than Brazil.

The structural qualifiers. Three features keep this from being an unambiguously “great” industry. First, commodity cyclicality: bank asset quality and loan demand are geared to copper prices and mining investment, so a copper reversal transmits directly to credit. Second, populist political risk, which in Peru has a specific and recurring form — Congress has authorized eight emergency AFP pension-fund withdrawals since 2019, shrinking system pension assets from ~US$52bn to ~US$22bn and permanently eroding Prima AFP’s fee base; interest-rate-cap and debt-relief bills surface periodically. Third, residual dollarization, a latent balance-sheet risk if the sol weakens sharply. The regulator (SBS) is generally orthodox and the sector is well-capitalized, but the political vector is real.

Verdict: structurally attractive — arguably the best structural setup among the large EM/LatAm banks. A concentrated, high-ROE, under-penetrated oligopoly with rational pricing, a long inclusion runway, an orthodox central bank and a stable currency is a genuinely good place to own the leader. It is more concentrated and rational than Brazil (Itaú) and carries a more stable currency than either Brazil or India (HDFC) — but it also carries a higher political/populist beta than India and a real commodity beta. Good industry; the leader captures most of the pool; the tax on ownership is Peru’s chronic political volatility.

4. Competitive Position

The moat, named (Greenwald taxonomy). BCP’s advantage is a liability-side cost advantage — the cheapest, stickiest deposit franchise in Peru — reinforced by economies of scale in distribution and technology and by customer captivity, with an emerging network-effect layer in Yape. This is not a narrative moat; it is anchored to a financial outcome that would collapse without it.

Mechanism 1 — the low-cost deposit franchise (the core, provable moat). Low-cost demand and savings deposits are 63.9% of BCP’s funding base, driving a group funding cost of just 2.31% and a soles NIM of 8.88%. No competitor can replicate this without matching BCP’s branch/agent/Yape distribution, its brand, and decades of primary-banking relationships (payroll accounts, direct debits, card-on-file). The proof is in the returns: BCP standalone ROAE of ~25% (FY2025) to ~30% (Q1’26) sits far above Peru’s ~13–15% cost of equity — the Competition Demystified ROIC test for a genuine moat is passed decisively, and remove the funding-cost edge and that ROE collapses toward peers.

Mechanism 2 — market-share stability (the Greenwald barrier-to-entry test). BCP has held ~33–36% of system loans and deposits and the #1 rank across every category persistently for years, and it is still gaining share (credit-card share +112bp in 2025, low-cost-funding share up to 41.2%). High, stable, growing share is the strongest available evidence of a durable barrier to entry rather than luck or a temporary lead.

Mechanism 3 — Yape as an emerging network effect (pressure-tested). The bull case for Yape is real: 16.4M MAU (~82% of economically-active Peruvians) is a two-sided payer/merchant network with genuine cross-side effects, +80% payment volume, and a rapidly monetizing lending vertical (revenue +3.6×) built on BCP’s incumbent deposit base and a decade of transaction data. The skeptical case is equally real: Yape began as a subsidized land-grab (free P2P; “disruptive” expenses +40% YoY, 84% of the disruptive budget); monetization is early (payments are only 47% of Yape revenue); a bank-consortium rival wallet, Plin (backed by BBVA, Interbank and Scotiabank), also has large scale, so Peru is arguably a two-wallet market rather than a Yape monopoly; and the BCRP is introducing UPI-style interoperable rails that could, over time, compress take-rates and invite entrants. Verdict on Yape: a real, emerging network-effect moat that widens an already-elite franchise — but optionality, not yet a settled, standalone profit engine.

Direct comparison vs. competitors. None of BBVA Perú, Interbank or Scotiabank Perú matches BCP’s scale, its ~40% efficiency ratio, or Yape’s reach; Scotiabank’s parent (BNS) is strategically retrenching from Latin America, which if anything hands BCP incremental share. On a cross-EM read, Credicorp’s group ROE (19–21%) sits between HDFC Bank (~14–15%) and Itaú (~23–25%), while BCP standalone (~25–30%) rivals Itaú’s core bank; BAP’s 63.9% low-cost funding materially exceeds HDFC’s ~39% CASA and Itaú’s deposit base on a like-for-like funding-cost basis, i.e., a stronger funding-cost edge in a smaller, higher-political-beta market.

Verdict: durable, wide competitive advantage. The moat is built on dominant scale plus the cheapest deposit franchise in Peru — proven in years of ~33% stable share and 25–30% BCP ROE — overlaid with an emerging Yape payment-network moat that is optionality on top of the bank. The honest debate is not “moat vs. no moat”; it is “how much of Yape’s upside is durable profit versus continuing land-grab spend,” and whether a fragmented, competitive Peruvian payments market lets Yape hold its economics as it monetizes.

5. Growth History and Forward Opportunities

Earnings arc — a recovery, not a straight line. Consolidated attributable net income (S/ mn) went 346.9 (2020, COVID) → 3,584.6 (2021) → 4,647.8 (2022) → 4,865.5 (2023, El Niño recession) → 5,501.3 (2024) → 6,925.4 (2025) — roughly an 18% CAGR off the COVID-depressed base, but with a visible mid-cycle wobble in 2023. The composition of the 2024→2025 jump matters: of the +258bp ROAE improvement, a large slice is cost-of-risk normalization (1.63% vs. 2.42%) — cyclical recovery, not purely structural growth. Q1 2026 was a record quarter: 21.1% ROE, 6.6% NIM, a record 5.81% risk-adjusted NIM, 1.3% cost of risk, and NPLs (4.3%) below pre-2023-recession levels.

Loan and deposit growth. Q1 2026 total loans grew +8.2% (quarter-end; +9.1% FX-neutral), with FY2026 guidance of ~8.5% reported / ~10.5% FX-neutral, accelerating through the year. By segment: BCP loans +7.3% (ROE 30.5%, cost of risk 0.8%, efficiency 38.6%); Mibanco +12.4% with all-time-high March disbursements (ROE 21.7%, all-time-low NPLs); Mibanco Colombia double-digit; Credicorp Capital AUM +28–34%. Critically, the wholesale/corporate book — flattish for ~5 years as “six presidents in five years” froze private investment — is now inflecting: private investment grew +11% in 2025, and domestic demand has run +4–5% YoY for six consecutive quarters. This is a genuine cyclical turn in the highest-quality part of the book, not just a retail push.

Forward opportunity set — the “decoupling strategy.” Management frames four growth anchors: (1) deepen under-penetrated markets (credit/GDP ~40%, a structural inclusion gap); (2) scale the integrated digital ecosystem (payments → lending → cross-sell) through the new neobank unit; (3) harvest cross-subsidiary synergies (shared data/analytics/risk); (4) deliver resilient through-cycle returns. The concrete growth assets are Yape (the swing asset — see below), Mibanco’s microfinance recovery post-El-Niño, regional export (Yape Bolivia >2M customers and market leader; Tenpo targeting Chile’s cash economy; Mibanco Colombia + Bancompartir), and the wholesale re-acceleration riding the Fujimori pro-investment agenda.

Yape — the monetization story, and the quality question. The single most important growth fact is that Yape is now monetizing an installed base, not buying users: at ~82% penetration, incremental growth comes from recurrence, multi-product attach and lending, and the operating leverage is inflecting (revenue per MAU +65% YoY vs. expense per MAU +26%). Lending is the fastest vertical (+3.6×; 5.7M loans disbursed in Q1 2026; only ~30% credit penetration). On the Q1 call, a sell-side analyst modeled Yape at ~30% of Credicorp earnings by 2028 (implying group ROE ~25%); management neither confirmed nor disputed it and hinted at a post-election “sustainable ROE north of 20%.” That is the upside — and it is unproven.

Verdict: high-quality growth, but cyclically flattered — do not extrapolate the 21% ROE. The quality signals are strong and genuine: returns-accretive Yape monetization (not land-grab), management explicitly running to risk-adjusted NIM rather than headline cost of risk, a durable low-cost funding moat, and structurally high segment ROEs. But the level is inflated by a trough cost of risk aided by three Q1 one-offs (mining profit-sharing bonuses lifting repayment, AFP-withdrawal liquidity repaying retail loans, and wholesale provision reversals), plus a copper-super-cycle tailwind. The high-quality trajectory is real; the record level is not the through-cycle run-rate. Normalized ROE is more likely mid-to-high teens (~17–18%) than the current 21%.

6. Financial Quality

Consolidated KPI trend (FY2023 / FY2024 / FY2025; Q1’26). The three-year record shows a franchise firing on every cylinder — which is exactly the reason to scrutinize sustainability.

Segment quality (FY2025). BCP standalone is the crown jewel: ROAE 24.7%, cost of risk 1.28%, efficiency 39.7%, CET1 13.99% (target 11%). Mibanco earns 16.6% IFRS ROAE (21.6% local-GAAP) with a fortress 17.3% CET1. Pacífico’s underwriting result rose 26% to S/882M. The consolidated balance sheet is strongly capitalized — common equity is ~14.4% of total assets, goodwill/intangibles are modest (so tangible book ≈ book), and the group carries a large net-liquidity position rather than net leverage in the corporate sense.

Quality-of-earnings verdict — the record ROE is materially cyclically flattered (the single most important finding in this report). Three factors inflate the reported 19–21% ROE above sustainable earning power:

1. Cost of risk is at a cyclical trough. It fell from ~2.5% (2023 El Niño + SME/consumer-card stress) to 1.63% (2025) to 1.3% (Q1’26). Management itself flags “point-in-time effects” (a wholesale client that “regularized,” provision reversals), calls the Q1 print “below expectations,” and guides cost of risk upward toward a mid-cycle ~1.8–2.0%+ as it pushes into higher-yield retail and Yape lending. Provisions fell 35% YoY in Q1 2026 — unsustainable.
2. NIM is near a cyclical high. It is boosted by (a) falling BCRP rates cutting funding cost (2.31%) faster than asset yields reprice, and (b) a transient surge of low-cost deposits — management concedes roughly half of recent deposit growth is one-off pension-fund-withdrawal money of uncertain stickiness, which will “decrease during this year and probably basically disappear.” A completed easing cycle eventually compresses asset yields.
3. Copper-super-cycle tailwind flatters both loan growth and asset quality across the mining-geared economy.

Offsetting these are genuine structural positives — the low-cost funding moat, ~46% efficiency, de-risked loan vintages, improved risk analytics, and the scalable Yape fee engine — which is why this is a high-quality franchise, not a mirage. But the honest conclusion is that normalized through-cycle ROE is ~17–18%, not the current 21% (management’s own FY2026 guide is ~19.5%). The two swing factors to monitor are cost-of-risk normalization and pension-deposit runoff.

Verdict: economics of the highest quality, but the current print sits at the top of the cycle. The moat converts to returns (ROA 2.65%, BCP ROE ~30%), the balance sheet is fortress-grade, and the trajectory is improving — but the reported ROE overstates the run-rate, and any valuation built on extrapolating 21% is building on cyclically-borrowed earnings.

7. Capital Allocation

Dividend-only capital return, rising with normalized earnings. Credicorp returns capital almost exclusively through an annual dividend, paid each June. On April 23, 2026, the Board declared a record S/50.00 per share (≈US$13.5, a ~3.4% yield on $400.81; total ~S/4,719M), up a striking path from the post-COVID rebuild: S/5.0 (2021) → S/15.0 (2022) → S/25.1 (2023) → S/46.1 (2024) → S/50.0 (declared 2026). The payout ratio is ~44%, leaving ~56% of earnings retained to fund ~8–9% loan growth plus the fintech build. This rising payout reflects capital normalizing toward internal targets (BCP CET1 11%, Mibanco 15%) rather than a shift to harvest mode — and indeed management is explicit that the priority is growth first, capital return second (“the priority is definitely growth”).

No buybacks — a structural, not strategic, absence. Bermuda law bars Credicorp from holding treasury shares, so there is no repurchase program; the 15.49% stake held via subsidiary Atlantic Security Holding Corp (ASHC) is a legacy, economically-treasury-like intra-group holding, not an active buyback. Capital return is dividend-only, which is a fair (if less flexible) model for a bank compounding book at high ROE.

Deployment — organic growth plus disciplined fintech, no empire-building. The bulk of retained capital funds organic loan growth. The “investment” line is the fintech portfolio — Yape, Culqi, Krealo, Tenpo (Chile), Yape Market — which absorbs the bulk of “disruptive” spend (Yape ~84%, +40% YoY) and is now approaching monetization. There is no history of large, debt-funded, value-destructive M&A; growth in microfinance came via Mibanco Peru plus the subscale Mibanco Colombia/Bancompartir. Management demonstrably applies ROIC discipline, setting explicit ROE and cost-income limits on new initiatives. The one item to watch is the rise in capitalized software/intangibles (goodwill S/722M → S/1,253M; intangibles S/2.4bn → S/3.6bn), which are CET1 deductions and reflect the tech build — worth monitoring but not alarming at current scale.

Insider and control read. As an FPI, Credicorp’s insiders file only sparse Forms 3/4/5 (just two Form 4 transactions since 2021; the 16 Form 3s are an April-2026 cluster of initial statements for new directors) — so there is no readable open-market insider buy/sell signal in either direction. Control rests with the Romero family (~12.29%, via Luis Romero Belismelis and associated entities; director Manuel Romero Valdez is non-independent) plus the ASHC intra-group stake; the 20-F reports no significant ownership change in three years. The free float is held by passive/value institutions (BlackRock ~4.5%, Dodge & Cox ~4.1%). Governance is a standing family-control consideration, not an acute risk, with an orderly CEO (Ferrari, 2023) and in-flight CFO succession, an independent audit committee, and a recently refreshed board.

Verdict: intelligent, conservative, shareholder-aligned capital allocation. A rising dividend funded by normalizing capital, ROIC-disciplined organic reinvestment, no value-destructive M&A, and a fintech build that is finally paying its way. The only structural limitation is the absence of buybacks (a Bermuda-law artifact), which removes a lever to exploit valuation dislocations — a minor negative for a bank that trades, as now, at a premium multiple.

8. Changes and Headwinds — Last Two Years

1. The Yape monetization inflection (2023 → 2026) — the single biggest positive change. Yape moved from a user-acquisition cost center to 8% of group risk-adjusted revenue and ROE-accretive, powered by the lending vertical (+3.6×) and rising revenue-per-MAU. This, more than macro, is what re-rated the stock.

2. Neobank consolidation (April 1, 2026). Yape (Peru + Bolivia), Eo and Tenpo (Chile) were combined into one unit under Raimundo Morales, to leverage shared tech/data and pursue regional expansion into cash-heavy economies.

3. Leadership and governance transitions. Gianfranco Ferrari has been CEO since 2023 and owns the decoupling/digital strategy; a CFO succession is in-flight (Alejandro Perez-Reyes moving to lead Mibanco, Ignacio Belaunde becoming CFO later in 2026); the board was refreshed at the AGM with three new directors. The transitions look orderly with a deep bench.

4. Record dividend and a stated growth-first priority. The S/50 dividend signals capital normalization, but management was explicit that reinvestment for growth outranks extraordinary distributions.

5. The El Niño climate cycle. The 2023 strong El Niño caused a Peruvian recession (~1.1% GDP hit) and drove the cost-of-risk spike now normalizing. For 2026, management is monitoring dual phenomena (a local “El Niño Costero,” already trimming the anchovy/fishing season, plus a Central Pacific event), sizing the GDP impact at ~0.8% (moderate) to ~1.7% (extraordinary), with clarity expected by ~September. No credit-policy change yet — a recurring, unpredictable headwind.

6. Rates and inflation shift. The BCRP policy rate (~4.25%) had been falling, driving BAP’s funding-cost decline and NIM expansion — but inflation ticked up to a two-year-high ~4% (April 2026) on transport/energy/food and an oil shock, so monetary conditions may stay “tighter for longer,” capping the funding-cost tailwind.

7. The AFP pension-withdrawal regime — the double-edged structural change. Congress approved an eighth early AFP withdrawal in September 2025 (up to ~US$7.5bn released), and cumulative 2019–2025 raids shrank system pension assets from ~US$52bn to ~US$22bn — a direct, permanent erosion of Prima AFP’s AUM/fee base. Crucially, the same September-2025 Pension System Modernization Law now prohibits future extraordinary withdrawals — structurally reducing the risk if a populist Congress does not reverse it. Counterintuitively, the raids have been a net liquidity tailwind for BCP: withdrawal cash flowed into low-cost deposits and let retail borrowers repay loans (flattering NPLs and cost of risk) — a tailwind management says will fade “during this year.”

8. The 2026 general election — the swing factor, now resolved (see the Variant Perception section for the political deep-dive). The market-friendly Keiko Fujimori won the June-7 runoff over the interventionist candidate; this de-risking, plus Yape, drove the run to the all-time high.

Verdict: on balance, the changes strengthen the near-term thesis but concentrate the risk. The genuine positives (Yape monetization, wholesale re-acceleration, a benign election outcome, an AFP-raid legal cap) are the very things that have re-rated the stock — meaning they are now substantially priced. The live headwinds (El Niño, tighter-for-longer rates, cost-of-risk normalization, the fading pension-deposit tailwind) all point toward earnings normalization from a cyclical peak, not further acceleration.

9. Risk Analysis

Peru concentrates an unusual amount of political and macro risk into a single high-quality franchise. The matrix below is ordered by materiality to the thesis.

Catastrophic-loss assessment. The probability of a permanent impairment of capital is low: the balance sheet is fortress-grade (CET1 ~14%, NPL coverage >110%, ample liquidity), and even the acute political tail (nationalization) is a low-probability event that just receded with the election. The realistic downside is not a wipeout but a multiple-and-earnings de-rating — a scenario in which cost of risk normalizes, ROE reverts to the mid-teens, Peru delivers one of its periodic political shocks, and the richest-ever multiple compresses toward its historical range. That is a double-digit drawdown, only partly cushioned by the ~3.5% dividend — not a total loss.

10. Valuation Discussion (Embedded Expectations)

No price target and no recommendation in this section. This is an analysis of what the current price implies.

Where the multiple sits. At $400.81, BAP trades at 2.87× book value (99.98th percentile of its own ten-year range — the richest ever), 15.3× trailing earnings (89.8th percentile), and 4.1× sales (99.94th), with a composite own-history valuation percentile of 96.6. Because goodwill is small, price-to-tangible-book is essentially the same ~2.9×. This is not merely a “high” multiple; it is the top of the stock’s entire distribution on every metric simultaneously.

Embedded-expectations decomposition (Gordon justified P/B). Using justified P/B = (ROE − g) / (COE − g), with a Peru USD cost of equity estimated at ~11–13% (US risk-free ~4.3% + a Peru equity-risk premium ~6.8–7.3% at an EM-bank beta ~1.0–1.1, i.e., a base ~12%) and sustainable USD book growth ~7% (payout ~44–50%, retention reinvested at ~19% ROE, less modest sol drift):

The observed 2.87× sits between the (COE 11% / ROE 19% → 3.00) and (COE 12% / ROE 21% → 2.80) cells. In plain terms, to justify the richest-ever multiple the market must underwrite both a sustained ~19–21% ROE (today’s peak, held indefinitely — not the ~15–16% mid-cycle norm and certainly not the ~8–13% political-trough of 2020–2023) and a compressed, Chile-like ~11–12% Peru cost of equity. Both peaks at once. For historical context, BAP traded ~1.3–1.8× book for most of its listed life; that range pencils cleanly at mid-cycle inputs (ROE ~15.5%, COE ~12.5%, g ~5.5% → ~1.4×). The doubling to 2.87× required the market to move its ROE assumption ~15% → ~19% and compress its COE assumption ~13% → ~11.5% together — neither lever alone gets there.

Cross-EM peer read — the sharpest single fact. BAP is the most expensively-priced large LatAm bank per unit of returns:

BAP pays more per unit of book (2.87×) than Itaú (2.15×) — a higher-quality, higher-ROE franchise. On equal cost-of-equity math a 23%-ROE Itaú “deserves” the richer multiple; that BAP trades richer implies the market is assigning Peru a lower cost of equity than Brazil (defensible — Peru’s fiscal/inflation record is better and the sol far more stable than the real) and/or capitalizing a Yape-driven growth premium not yet in the trailing numbers. Against the broader region, Banco de Chile (~2.5–3× book on ~20% ROE) is the closest analog — i.e., the market is pricing Peru risk as if it were Chile-like, not Andean-volatile. HDFC is the mirror image: a comparable franchise at the opposite valuation extreme.

Scenario skeleton (3-year, return drivers only — no point target). Book ≈ $139; payout ~44–50% so book compounds at roughly ROE × 0.5.

• Bear — Peru political/commodity shock, cost of risk normalizes, ROE reverts toward ~14%, COE widens to ~13%+, multiple de-rates to ~1.5–1.8× (still above the ~1.4× historical trough). Book compounds ~7%/yr to ~$171; at ~1.65× that is well below today’s price — a material multiple-driven drawdown only partly cushioned by the dividend.
• Base — ROE holds ~17–18%, Peru stable, COE ~12%, multiple mean-reverts to ~2.2–2.5×. Book compounds ~8.5%/yr to ~$178; at ~2.35× that is roughly flat-to-modestly-higher on price plus the ~3.5% dividend — a low-to-mid-single-digit total USD return as multiple reversion offsets book growth.
• Bull — Yape delivers a genuine fee-earnings step-up, ROE sustains ~19–20%, Peru keeps upgrading (COE toward 11%), multiple holds ~2.8–3.0×. Book compounds ~9.5%/yr to ~$183; at ~2.9× that is ~+15–20% on price plus dividend — but note even the bull case is mostly book growth plus dividend, because the multiple is already at its record ceiling with little re-rating fuel left.

What must be true to justify 2.87× book: (1) ROE sustains ~19–20% (no reversion to mid-cycle or trough); (2) Yape converts scale into a durable fee/earnings growth premium — a growth multiple layered on a bank; (3) Peru political risk stays benign with a cost-of-equity on an investment-grade re-rating path; (4) copper/terms-of-trade stay supportive. All four must hold together — break any one and the Gordon math re-rates the multiple down. The embedded-expectations conclusion is that the stock has already captured its re-rating; forward return now depends on ROE durability, not further multiple expansion, and the skew is to the downside.

11. Variant Perception

Consensus view. The prevailing narrative — reinforced by Morgan Stanley’s June-2026 upgrade to Overweight (PT $480) — is that Credicorp is a best-in-class EM bank enjoying a virtuous convergence: a benign, market-friendly election outcome, a monetizing fintech crown jewel (Yape), a cyclical earnings upswing, and a stable macro — and that these justify both the record ROE and the record multiple, with more upside as Yape scales toward ~30% of earnings by 2028.

The strongest bull case. Peru is a genuinely better-run EM than its Andean neighbors (investment-grade, orthodox central bank, one of the most stable EM currencies), BCP is more dominant within Peru than Itaú is within Brazil, and Yape is a rare EM-fintech success layering a real growth option onto an already-elite bank. If Fujimori delivers her pro-investment agenda, the sovereign re-rates toward a higher IG band (compressing the cost of equity), and Yape’s operating leverage carries group ROE sustainably above 20%, then 2.87× book is not a bubble but a fair price for a superior compounder — and the closest analog (Banco de Chile at ~2.5–3× book) says a low-country-risk Andean bank can hold this multiple.

The strongest bear case. The current price capitalizes multiple peaks at once. The record ROE is cyclically flattered (trough cost of risk, peak NIM, transient pension liquidity) and normalizes toward ~17–18%; the good news (election, Yape) is substantially priced after a +88% run to an all-time high; the factor model is unambiguous that BAP is a leveraged, crowded bet on Peru itself (Country:Peru beta 0.95, factor-twins the Peru ETF and the other Peru bank), not a diversified compounder — so the entire thesis mean-reverts on one Peru political or copper shock, exactly the event that produced the −41% (2021) and −65% (lifetime) drawdowns. From the richest-ever multiple, the risk/reward is asymmetric to the downside.

The 3–5 assumptions that matter most, and what would falsify each:

1. ROE durability (~19–20% sustainable). Falsified by: cost of risk normalizing toward ~2% and ROE printing below ~17% for two-plus quarters. (Bull leg / most load-bearing.)
2. Yape becomes a durable earnings pillar (not land-grab). Falsified by: revenue-per-MAU growth stalling, take-rate compression from UPI-style rails, or Plin taking share — Yape’s contribution plateauing below ~10% of earnings.
3. Peru cost of equity stays compressed / on an upgrade path. Falsified by: a Fujimori impeachment/gridlock spiral, renewed AFP raids, or a sovereign-outlook downgrade — re-widening the country risk premium.
4. Copper/macro stay supportive. Falsified by: a copper reversal dragging GDP, private investment and loan demand.
5. The multiple holds near its record. Falsified by: mean reversion toward the ~1.4–2.0× book BAP itself carried for most of its history — a 25–45% de-rating on multiple alone.

The factor-positioning tell (where consensus may be offsides). The tape is a smooth, high-Sharpe (y1 Sharpe 2.56, max drawdown only −15.7%), low-drawdown one-way street to an all-time high, with valuation at the 99.98th own-history percentile — the classic signature of a crowded, well-owned, quality-momentum trade. Consensus is likely offsides not on the quality (which is real) but on the durability of a single-country momentum trade at a record multiple: with ~58% of the stock’s variance idiosyncratic and its dominant factor a volatile EM country, the position is far more fragile than its recent smoothness implies. The variant perception is that BAP’s price already embeds the best-case resolution of the very risks (politics, Yape, cost of risk) that are most likely to disappoint from here.

12. Fact vs. Interpretation Table

13. Open Questions

1. Yape’s standalone P&L and the path to “~30% of earnings by 2028.” Management measures disruptive units on revenue, not disclosed net income. Is Yape net-income-positive today, and what is the realistic 2028 earnings share? This is the single biggest unproven bull lever.
2. Normalized/sustainable ROE. Management promised a post-election “sustainable ROE north of 20%” figure — expected on the Q2’26 call (~August 2026). How much of the 21% is durable vs. cyclical?
3. Pension-withdrawal deposit stickiness. Roughly half of recent deposit growth is one-off AFP-withdrawal liquidity; how much runs off, and how fast does it compress NIM?
4. Plin’s scale. The rival bank-consortium wallet’s MAU/volume is needed to size Yape’s network-effect durability and take-rate risk.
5. Copper/El Niño trajectory into H2-2026. Clarity on the dual El Niño phenomena is expected ~September; a copper reversal or a strong El Niño would test the cyclically-flattered earnings.
6. Fujimori governability. Will a thin-mandate, legally-clouded Fujimori government deliver the promised investment acceleration, or descend into the impeachment/gridlock dynamic that felled her predecessors? The base rate for Peruvian presidents completing terms is poor.
7. Precise Peru credit/GDP penetration (BCRP/World Bank) to size the long-run inclusion runway.

14. What Must Be True (Bull and Bear)

Bull case — what must be true, and its falsification test. Credicorp sustains a ~19–20% group ROE through the cycle; Yape converts its 82% penetration into a durable, high-margin fee-and-lending earnings pillar (toward ~30% of earnings) that layers a growth multiple onto the bank; Peru stays on a benign, pro-investment, ratings-upgrade path that keeps the cost of equity compressed toward Chile-like levels; and copper/terms-of-trade remain supportive. If all hold, 2.87× book is fair-to-cheap for a superior compounder and the stock delivers book growth (~9–10%) plus a ~3.5% dividend with the multiple intact.

Falsification test: Cost of risk normalizes toward ~2% and group ROE prints below ~17% for two or more consecutive quarters, or Yape’s contribution plateaus below ~10% of earnings. Either shows the record ROE was cyclical and the growth premium illusory — and the Gordon math re-rates 2.87× toward ~2.0×.

Bear case — what must be true, and its falsification test. The record ROE is a cyclical peak (trough cost of risk, peak NIM, transient pension liquidity) that normalizes to ~17–18%; the good news is fully priced after a +88% run; and Peru delivers one of its periodic political or commodity shocks, re-widening the cost of equity and compressing the richest-ever multiple toward its historical ~1.4–2.0× range — a double-digit drawdown only partly cushioned by the dividend.

Falsification test: Cost of risk stays below ~1.5% and group ROE holds ~20%+ across the next four quarters while Yape’s earnings share keeps climbing and Peru’s sovereign outlook improves — demonstrating the “peak” was actually a new structural plateau, and that 2.87× book is a durable, justified multiple rather than a cycle-top.

The tell that separates the two: the cost-of-risk trajectory and the durability of Yape’s earnings contribution over the next 2–4 quarters. Both are directly observable, and management has already guided cost of risk upward — which is why the burden of proof rests on the bull.

APPENDIX A — Standard Diligence Questionnaire

Credicorp Ltd. (NYSE: BAP) · Report date 2026-07-11 · Supplemental to the research memo (not counted toward the length standard). Fact / Interpretation / Assumption labels applied where material.

General

What thoughtful questions have other investors asked about this company? (1) Is the record 19–21% ROE sustainable, or cyclically flattered by a trough cost of risk and pension-withdrawal liquidity? (Interpretation: materially flattered; through-cycle ~17–18%.) (2) Can Yape reach ~30% of group earnings by 2028, and is it net-income-positive today? (3) How much of the +88% run is the market-friendly election outcome vs. Yape, and is it now priced? (4) Does a razor-thin-mandate Fujimori government deliver stability or the usual impeachment cycle? (5) Why does BAP trade richer than Itaú on a lower ROE — is Peru’s cost of equity really lower than Brazil’s? (6) What happens to NIM when the pension-deposit liquidity runs off and the easing cycle completes?

Cyclicality & Earnings Nature

Are earnings at a cyclical high or low? A cyclical high (Interpretation). Cost of risk (1.3% Q1’26) is at a trough vs. ~2.5% in 2023; NIM (6.6%) is near a peak; ~half of recent deposit growth is one-off AFP-withdrawal liquidity. Driven by external environment or internal action? Both — internal (low-cost funding moat, Yape monetization, efficiency) and external (falling rates, copper super-cycle, benign credit cycle, election de-risking). How stable are revenues? NII, fees, insurance premiums and pension fees are recurring/annuity-like; treasury gains and cost of risk are cyclical. Revenue carries a commodity/macro beta (mining ~14.4% of GDP). Outlook for products/services? Structural growth from low banking penetration (credit/GDP ~40%) and Yape-led inclusion; FY2026 loan-growth guide ~8.5% reported / ~10.5% FX-neutral. How big will this market be? Growing — an under-penetrated ~34M-population economy with a large informal segment; primarily domestic Peru, with small Bolivia/Chile/Colombia footprints.

Business Quality & Competitive Moat

Is the industry getting more or less competitive? Broadly stable — a rational four-firm oligopoly (~82% share); the main new competitive vector is digital payments (Plin vs. Yape) and future UPI-style interoperable rails. How profitable is the business (ROIC/ROE)? Group ROAE 19–21%; BCP standalone ROAE ~25–30% — among the best EM banks. How profitable is the industry, and barriers to entry? Very — BCP’s ~25–30% ROE proves a fat pool; barriers are scale, the low-cost deposit base, distribution, brand and data. Can the business be easily understood? Yes at the unit level (deposits × spread × credit cost, plus fees/underwriting). Undermined by foreign low-cost labor? No — a domestic deposit/lending franchise. Do brands matter? Yes — BCP and Yape are trust/brand assets in a market where trust is scarce. Nature of competition? Scale and funding-cost driven; rational pricing among the big four. Customer switching costs? Real — primary-banking relationships (payroll, direct debits, card-on-file) and Yape’s payment-network lock-in.

Financial Condition & Balance Sheet

Assets not fully recognized on the balance sheet? The Yape franchise value and the low-cost deposit intangible are not capitalized (Interpretation — genuine hidden value). Off-balance-sheet liabilities? Standard bank contingencies (guarantees, undrawn lines); nothing unusual flagged. How conservative is the accounting? Reasonably — IFRS, NPL coverage >110%, fortress CET1 (~14% common-equity/assets); watch the rising capitalized software/intangibles (goodwill S/1.25bn, intangibles S/3.6bn). How CapEx-hungry? Low physical CapEx (asset-light digital shift); the “investment” is fintech opex (disruptive spend +40% YoY), which flows through the P&L, not CapEx.

Capital Allocation & Management

How much FCF, and how is it used? For a bank, read distributable earnings: ~44% paid as dividends, ~56% retained for ~8–9% loan growth + fintech. Philosophy? Growth-first, capital-return-second (management explicit). Significant acquisitions recently? No large M&A; bolt-on fintech (Tenpo, Culqi) and microfinance (Mibanco Colombia/Bancompartir, subscale). Buying back shares? No — Bermuda law bars treasury shares; the 15.49% ASHC stake is legacy intra-group. Issuing shares to insiders? No material dilution (~79.4M shares stable for years). Compensation policy / director motivations? Family-influenced control (Romero ~12.3% + board); orderly CEO(2023)/CFO succession; independent audit committee; ROIC-disciplined initiative approval. Insider signal? None readable — FPI files only sparse Forms 3/4 (2 Form 4 since 2021).

Valuation & Market Data

ADR, MLP, or K-1? NYSE-listed common shares of a Bermuda holding company (not an ADR in the depositary-receipt sense, not an MLP, no K-1); files 20-F. Dividend policy? Annual dividend paid each June; record S/50/share (2026), ~3.4% yield, ~44% payout, rising with normalized capital. How profitable? Highly — ROA 2.65%, ROE 19–21%. Is net income diverging from cash from operations? For a bank, operating cash flow is dominated by balance-sheet flows (deposits/loans) and is not a clean quality signal; the relevant checks (NPL coverage, capital, provisioning) are conservative — no red flag.

Risks & Downside

What would cause the stock to decline? Multiple compression from the richest-ever 2.87× book; cost-of-risk normalization compressing ROE; a Peru political/governability shock; a copper reversal; Yape monetization disappointment; a strong El Niño; NIM compression as the easing cycle completes and pension liquidity runs off. Risk of catastrophic loss? Low — fortress balance sheet; the acute nationalization tail receded with the election. Chance of a total loss? Very low absent a systemic Peruvian collapse (nationalization/hyperinflation) — a low-probability tail. The realistic downside is a de-rating drawdown, not a wipeout.

Recent News & Events

Has the business environment changed recently? Yes, materially and favorably near-term: the market-friendly Keiko Fujimori won the June-2026 election (interventionist candidate lost; inauguration 28-Jul-2026); Yape crossed into ROE-accretive monetization; the neobank unit was consolidated (April 2026); the AFP-withdrawal regime was legally capped (Sept 2025). Significant acquisitions? None material. Accounting-policy changes? None flagged. Other recent changes? Record S/50 dividend; CFO succession in-flight; new-market pushes (Tenpo Chile, Yape Bolivia); inflation ticking up to a 2-year high (~4%) capping the rate tailwind. Net: the environment improved, but the improvements are substantially reflected in the all-time-high price.

APPENDIX B — Source Appendix

Credicorp Ltd. (NYSE: BAP) · Report date 2026-07-11. Primary sources first; All URLs accessed 2026-07-10/11.

Primary — Company Filings & Disclosures (SEC EDGAR, CIK 0001001290)

• Form 20-F, FY2025 (filed 2026-04-27) — annual report; segment contribution, market-share (SBS) tables, NIM-by-currency, cost-of-risk, efficiency, capital ratios, ownership. https://www.sec.gov/Archives/edgar/data/1001290/000100129026000008/bap-20251231.htm
• Form 6-K, Q1 2026 earnings release & materials (May 2026) — Q1’26 ROE 21.1%, NIM 6.6%, cost of risk 1.3%, loan growth, Yape metrics.
• Form 6-K, dividend declaration (2026-04-23) — record S/50.00/share dividend, paid 2026-06-12.
• Form 6-K, neobank-unit consolidation (2026-04-01) — Yape/Eo/Tenpo/Yape Bolivia under Raimundo Morales.
• Q1 2026 earnings-call transcript (2026-05-15) — management commentary on ROE guidance (~19.5%), cost-of-risk normalization, Yape monetization, El Niño sizing, Peru election/bicameralism, pension-withdrawal liquidity. (Management commentary treated as hypothesis, validated against filings.)
• Prior 20-Fs / 6-Ks (2021–2025) enumerated via EDGAR — earnings/dividend/governance cadence; SC 13G filings (BlackRock, Dodge & Cox).
• Schedules 13G/13G-A — BlackRock (~4.5–5.4%), Dodge & Cox (~4.1%); ownership/float.

Primary — Quantitative Data Services

• Own-history valuation percentiles (USD) — price $400.81 (2026-07-10), P/E 15.28× (89.8th), P/B 2.87× (99.98th — richest ever), P/S 4.13× (99.94th), book $139.42/sh, TTM EPS $26.24.
• Five-year daily price series — split/dividend-adjusted OHLC + moving averages; five-year event map, 52-week/5-year ranges, 200-EMA.
• Financial news wires — Morgan Stanley upgrade to Overweight, PT $480 (2026-06-17); JPMorgan downgrade to Neutral, PT $415 (2026-06-15).
• Aggregated fundamental data services — multi-year income statement, balance sheet, per-share and profitability data (reported in PEN; used for the net-income trajectory and reconciled to the 20-F).
• FactorsToday — leaderboard (y1 +87.9% ann., Sharpe 2.56, max DD −15.7%; lifetime max DD −64.9%), stock-loadings (Country:Peru beta 0.951, R² 0.42), stock-info (beta 0.72, alpha +0.305, RS), related-stocks (IFS 0.968, EPU, SCCO). https://www.factorstoday.com/api

Secondary — Macro, Political & Industry

• SBS (Superintendencia de Banca, Seguros y AFP) — banking-sector market shares (via 20-F).
• BCRP (Banco Central de Reserva del Perú) — policy rate (~4.25%), inflation, FX (sol), reserves.
• BBVA Research, “Peru Economic Outlook” (2026) — GDP, inflation, copper, sol forecasts. https://www.bbvaresearch.com/en/publicaciones/peru-economic-outlook-march-2026/
• Moody’s / S&P / Fitch — Peru sovereign ratings (Baa1 / BBB- / BBB) and outlooks.
• 2026 Peruvian general election — first round 12–13 April; runoff 7 June; Keiko Fujimori (Fuerza Popular) win over Roberto Sánchez; inauguration 28 July. Sources: Wikipedia “2026 Peruvian general election”; NPR (2026-05-18); Atlantic Council; Britannica; Credendo; AS/COA.
• Herbert Smith Freehills Kramer / Mondaq, “Return of Fujimorismo” (2026) — Fujimori “Peru with Order” platform (pro-mining, deregulatory).
• AFP pension-withdrawal regime — 8th withdrawal (Sept 2025) and Pension System Modernization Law prohibiting future raids; system AFP AUM ~US$52bn → ~US$22bn. Sources: Fund Pro; LatinNews; Scotiabank Latam Daily (2025-09-22); AméricaEconomía.
• Keiko Fujimori Odebrecht case — suspended/dismissed money-laundering proceedings. Sources: VOA; MercoPress (2026-01-14); Bloomberg (2024-07-01).

Analytical Frameworks

• Greenwald & Kahn, Competition Demystified — moat taxonomy, market-share-stability and ROIC tests, applied to BCP’s low-cost-deposit franchise and the Yape network effect.
• Edward Chancellor (ed.), Capital Returns (Marathon) — capital-cycle lens on Peruvian banking concentration.
• Peer valuation cross-read: Itaú Unibanco (ITUB, ~2.15× book, ~23% ROE) and HDFC Bank (HDB, ~2.1× book, ~14–15% ROE), from their respective public filings.